A CHARACTERIZATION OF THE EXTENDED CLAIM-EGALITARIAN SOLUTION

Some monotonicity conditions for bargaining problems with claims are presented. They are used in providing a characterization of the extended claim-egalitarian solution.

Efficient solutions for bargaining problems with claims

Two solution concepts have been proposed for bargaining problems with claims, namely, the proportional solution, introduced by Chun & Thomson (1992), and the extended claim-egalitarian solution, [see Bossert (1993) and Marco (1993)]. Neither of these solutions exhaust all possible gains from cooperation. In this paper we introduce and provide axiomatic characterizations of different lexicographic extensions of the aforementioned proposals, which provide efficient solutions.Bargaining problems with claims, lexicographic extensions

Solución de pérdidas proporcionales para el problema de negociación bipersonal

In Kalai-Smorodinsky's solution utility gains are seen as relevant with regard to the disagreement point. This paper focuses on the utility losses with respect to the maximum achievable level and introduces a "complementary" solution to Kalai-Smorodinsky's. An axiomatic characterization of the proposed solution is also provided. La solución Kalai-Smorodinsky toma como relevantes las ganancias de utilidad desde el desacuerdo, nosotros centramos la atención en las pérdidas de utilidad respecto del nivel máximo alcanzable y consideramos una forma de introducir una solución "complementaria" de la presentada por Kalai y Smorodinsky. Asímismo, proveemos una caracterización axiomática de la solución propuesta.

A note on the equal-loss principle for bargaining problems

Some shortcomings of the equal-loss solution for bargaining problems are noticed: in general, it is not individually rational, and in case it is, then turns out a selection of the YU solutions. Finally, a new way of proving characterization results is provided.

A new prospect of additivity in bankruptcy problems

This paper explores additivity-like properties ful led by bankruptcy rules. Our main result is that the unique rule satisfying an adittivity-like property is the Minimal Overlap proposed by O'Neill. We also propose some conections relative to additivity properties in close frameworks as bargaining rules.This work is partially supported by the Institut Valencià d´Investigacions Econòmiques and the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia under projects SEJ2007-62656 (Alcalde) and SEJ2007-64649 (Marco-Gil and Silva). Marco-Gil also acknowledges support by the Fundación Séneca of the Agencia de Ciencia y Tecnología of the Murcian Region, under project 05838/PHCS/07 (Programa de Generación Cientìfico de Excelencia)

El rol del terapeuta ocupacional en el uso de la interfaz cerebro-computadora para el manejo de dispositivos electrónicos y ortoprotésicos

Los sistemas de interfaz cerebro-computadora (Brain-Computer Interfaces-BCI), son una tecnología en auge y pleno desarrollo, que pretende traducir y convertir los pensamientos del usuario, a través de señales cerebrales, en acciones y comandos, lo que permitiría a los usuarios comunicarse, manejar el entorno y otros dispositivos que le facilitarán el desempeño en su vida diaria. A través de este trabajo se pretende comprobar si hay evidencia científica acerca de mejorías y beneficios del uso de los sistemas BCI en pacientes con lesión medular y amputaciones, introduciéndolos en el campo de la rehabilitación desde Terapia Ocupacional.<br /

Equal-loss solution for monotonic coalitional games

A new solution concept to monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility is introduced. This proposal, called the coalitional equal-loss solution, is based on the idea that players withing a coalition should have equal losses from a point of maximum expectations. The proposal generalizes the rational equal-loss solution defined on the subclass of bargaining problems as well as the Shapley value defined on the subclass of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility.Coalitional Games, Rational Equal-Loss Solution, Shapley Value

A new prospect of additivity in bankruptcy problems

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity on the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called µ-Additivity. We find that µ-Additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by O'Neill (1982).bankruptcy problems, additivity, minimal overlap rule.

Merging and Going Bankrupt: A Neutral Solution

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called m-additivity. We find that m-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982)

Merging and Going Bankrupt: A Neutral Solution

As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper proposes a notion of partial Additivity in this context, to be called m-additivity. We find that m-additivity, together with two quite compelling axioms, anonymity and continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap rule, introduced by Neill (1982)